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INTRODUCTION 
At its 19th Party Congress, the ruling Communist 
Party of China included a commitment in its 
constitution to follow “the principle of achieved 
shared growth through discussion and 
collaboration, and pursuing the Belt and Road  
Initiative”.1 The statement, which elevates the 
status of Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy, 
underlined the current president’s expanding 
power while emphasizing the initiative’s 
significance beyond Xi’s presidential term. The 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a vast 
programme to revitalize ancient trade routes 
between Asia, Africa and Europe through heavy 
investments in continental and maritime 
infrastructure projects, in other words, is here to 
stay.  
 
The party’s unwavering dedication to the BRI 
will undoubtedly affect China’s relations with 
Europe, where the implications of growing 
Chinese infrastructure investments are 
increasingly felt. While initially viewed as a 
welcome support to Europe’s debt-ridden South 
and underdeveloped East, recent statements by 
the EU and its larger member states primarily 
stress the challenges which the BRI presents for 
Europe’s unity, prosperity and security.2 This 
change in stance comes as no surprise. The BRI, 
as the first two sections of our briefing suggest, 
has yet to live up to its promise of being an 
inclusive, multilateral and sustainable ‘win-win’ 
project from which all parties stand to gain. 
Most concerning from a European perspective 
is the persistent absence of a level-playing field 
China’s 19th Party Congress unexpectedly 
amended the party’s constitution with a 
pledge to “pursue the Belt and Road 
Initiative”. This further elevates the status 
of president Xi’s heavily promoted foreign 
policy, which aims at creating trade and 
investment opportunities through the 
development of Eurasia’s continental and 
maritime infrastructure. As the implications 
of this policy are increasingly felt across 
Europe, following years of growing Chinese 
investments, so are the challenges it 
presents to Europe’s unity, prosperity and 
security. In light of these challenges a 
constructive engagement with China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) constitutes an 
immense task for the European Union, 
whose position has been weakened by 
growing dissent among member states over 
the Union’s policy towards China. 
  
 




in investment relations as well as China’s 
growing influence over individual member 
states, which increasingly hamper the EU’s 
ability to deal with China collectively. 
 
Considering the latter, our third section argues 
that the EU’s ambition to constructively engage 
with China’s BRI constitutes an increasingly 
daunting task as dissent among member states 
over the Union’s China policy continues to rise. 
This is not to say that the EU is incapable of 
shaping China’s initiative. The EU’s market size, 
Chinese investment interests and the BRI’s 
pressure to succeed all strengthen the EU’s 
position to negotiate a BRI that works for all. 
Doing so, however, will require a strong and 
creative effort to unite member states behind a 
clear and robust European position. 
AN INCLUSIVE, MULTILATERAL AND 
SUSTAINABLE INITIATIVE? THE BRI IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
When addressing delegates at the first Belt and 
Road Forum in May, Chinese president Xi 
Jinping did not fail to emphasize BRI’s 
cooperative and inclusive character.3 The 
initiative, as Cui Tiankai, China’s ambassador in 
Washington, had put it, would not be a ‘solo 
show’ but rather a symphony performed by all 
participating countries.4 The Belt and Road 
forum held in Beijing, a spectacle attended by 
delegations from 130 states and international 
organizations, served to prove this point. 
 
The event, moreover, is not the only testimony 
of BRI’s multilateral aspirations. Chinese efforts 
to enhance the initiative’s cooperative image, for 
instance, reflect in the establishment of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a 
multilateral development bank, which started 
operations in 2016. The AIIB, while not directly 
linked to the BRI, assists the initiative’s 
implementation by providing loans for related 
infrastructure projects. A British government 
decision in 2015 to defy US pressure and join 
the Chinese-led institution was a crucial moment 
in strengthening the bank’s multilateral character 
as it triggered a wave of accessions by European 
as well as regional economies, including South 
Korea and Australia.5 European states, and the 
UK in particular, played an important part in 
strengthening the multilateral image of both the 
AIIB, and by extension China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative. 
 
This multilateral image, however, quickly fades 
at a second glance. The AIIB, despite its 
increasingly diverse membership, continues to 
be firmly controlled by China, which maintains a 
de-facto veto on substantial board decisions 
(taken by a 75% supermajority). The gap 
between China’s voting share (27.5%) and that 
of second-ranked India (7.9%) furthermore 
constitutes the largest in any multilateral 
development bank.6 Moreover, it is important to 
note that the AIIB’s multilateral character stands 
out within the network of institutions, which 
finance BRI-related infrastructure investments. 
Within this network, state-owned institutions, 
above all the Silk Road Fund, the China 
Development Bank (CDB), the Export-Import 
Bank of China (Exim) and China’s state-owned 
commercial banks currently set the tone while 
the AIIB only constitutes a minor component.7 
Xi’s recent pledge to invest an extra $14,5bn 
into the Silk Road Fund and launch a $43.5bn 
lending scheme operated by CDB and Exim, 
furthermore underscores China’s intent to 
maintain control over the finance and 
implementation of its envisioned Belt and 
Road.8 
 
In turn, this finance structure diminishes hopes 
for a multilateral regulation of implementation 
and operation standards. Environmental or 
transparency standards agreed in the AIIB, in 
which Europeans have a seat at the table, cannot 
guarantee their application in BRI projects 
financed by other institutions. At the same time, 
recent European experiences with Chinese 
  
 




infrastructure investments indicate that high 
transparency and sustainability standards, and 
their consistent application, cannot be taken for 
granted. Chinese investments in a rail link 
between Budapest and Belgrade, a BRI 
showcase project in Europe, are currently under 
investigation for their compliance with EU 
public procurement law.9 In another case, the 
construction of a Polish highway by a Chinese 
state-owned contractor led to price-dumping 
allegations and the contract’s eventual 
cancellation following the provider’s financial 
difficulties.10 Chinese investments in the 
construction and renovation of thermal power 
plants in Serbia and Bosnia moreover raised 
environmental objections and questioned BRI’s 
aspiration to provide sustainable and 
environmental friendly solutions.11 Considering 
these experiences, it comes as no surprise that 
Europeans have become increasingly concerned 
with the BRI’s commitment to social, 
environmental and transparency standards. At 
the Belt and Road Forum in May, these 
concerns led Europeans to snub Xi Jinping by 
refusing to sign a trade document for its lacking 
commitment to transparency and sustainability 
standards.12 
IS THE BRI A WIN-WIN PROJECT? 
Alongside promising an inclusive, multilateral 
and sustainable initiative, a catchphrase in the 
promotion of BRI has been its potential to 
provide ‘win-win cooperation’. Infrastructure 
investments, the argument goes, would create 
trade and investment opportunities from which 
all parties stand to gain. While this notion is 
persuasive, a closer look at the present impact of 
BRI-related investments in Europe gives reasons 
to doubt whether these have left Europeans 
better off.  
 
The EU’s trade balance with China has been 
consistently negative for the past decade, 
reaching a record low of -€180bn (trade in 
goods) in 2015.13 Improved infrastructure links 
and falling transportation costs stand to 
disproportionately benefit China. A pilot 
container train on the Yiwu-Riga route, an 
overland rail link, illustrates the potential effect. 
Since being put on rails, the train has mainly run 
in one direction: from China to Europe.14 
 
Growing Chinese investments in Europe’s 
infrastructure and high-tech sectors moreover 
leave Europeans increasingly worried about 
persistent trade and investment barriers. In 
2016, Chinese investments in the EU increased 
by 77%.15 In the same period, EU investment in 
China declined by a quarter.16 The European 
Chamber of Commerce in this light warned 
about a persistent lack in reciprocity, noting that 
many of China’s investments, such as Midea’s 
takeover of Kuka, a German robotics maker, 
would be unimaginable investments for 
European companies in China.17 This warning 
has been echoed by the European Commission, 
which, following a string of Chinese investments 
in sensitive European assets, including utilities, 
transportation infrastructure and technology 
identified the establishment of reciprocity as a 
pressing challenge.18 
 
Large-scale Chinese investment in Europe’s 
infrastructure, moreover, does not only bring 
about economic challenges. Worries are also 
directed at China’s growing political clout in 
Europe, which might increasingly enable China 
to neutralize the EU’s stance on contentious 
issues by wheedling individual member states 
into blocking joint EU statements and 
initiatives. For instance, in June Greece blocked 
an EU statement prepared for the scheduled 
review of China’s human rights situation in the 
UN Human Rights Council. Following a foreign 
ministry spokesperson, Athens rejected the 
statement on the grounds of providing 
‘unproductive criticism’.19 It was the first time 
that the EU was unable to formulate a joint 
  
 




opinion for the review of an individual country 
at the UNHRC.  
 
On another occasion, Hungary and Greece, 
both major recipients of Chinese infrastructure 
investments, pressed the EU into toning down 
its reaction to a ruling by the permanent court of 
arbitration (PCA) issued in July 2016, which 
sought to settle a maritime dispute between the 
Philippines and China over the legal basis for 
Chinese claims to ‘historical rights’ to resources 
in the South China Sea. When China rejected 
the Court’s decision as ‘naturally null and void’ 
the EU reacted with an uninspired 
acknowledgement of the ruling rather than the 
appeal to international law many had hoped 
for.20 Both events have since given rise to 
concerns that China’s rising political clout would 
erode the EU’s ability to perform its role as an 
upholder of human rights and an international 
rule of law. 
MOVING FORWARD: HOW EUROPEANS 
SEEK TO SHAPE BRI’S FUTURE 
Following the increasingly salient implications of 
Chinese investments in Europe’s infrastructure, 
EU member states and institutions have become 
eager to identify suitable responses. One 
reaction has been a push to strengthen 
European coordination in the AIIB. As 
members of the institution, Europeans hold 
around 20% of the votes in the bank’s executive 
board; nearly enough to block substantial 
decisions taken by supermajority (75%). Vote 
coordination and cooperation with like-minded 
partners, such as Australia (3.6%) and South 
Korea (3.7%), thus presents a potential tool for 
Europeans to exert influence over the standards 
that the AIIB applies in financing BRI-related 
projects.21 At the same time, vote coordination 
in the AIIB gives Europeans only limited 
influence over the implementation of China’s 
Belt and Road initiative as the AIIB, at least so 
far, only finances a fraction of BRI-related 
investments. To shape the implementation of 
China’s Belt and Road initiative, other measures 
are therefore necessary. 
 
In response to this, the European Commission 
suggested the establishment of a European 
mechanism for screening foreign investments in 
strategic assets, which include critical 
technologies, infrastructure, inputs or sensitive 
information.22 This measure, the Commission 
argued, would enable the Union to ward off the 
risks that foreign investments present to 
Europe’s security and economic openness. 
Moreover, it would assist smaller EU member 
states, many of which have no national 
mechanism for screening foreign investments.23 
To substantiate the proposal, Commission 
president Juncker used his State of the Union 
address to outline: (1) a European framework 
for the screening of investments at member 
state level, (2) a cooperation mechanism 
between member states and the Commission, 
which can be activated when foreign 
investments in one or several member states 
may affect the security or public order of 
another, and (3) a European screening 
mechanism for investments affecting projects 
and programmes of Union interests.24 
 
While these proposals received strong support 
from the Union’s major economies, not all 
member states are equally enthusiastic. 25 In 
June, an ad-hoc coalition of smaller members 
(Greece, Malta, the Czech Republic, Sweden, 
Portugal, Finland and the Netherlands) used a 
European Council meeting to water down a 
statement calling on the Commission to examine 
mechanisms for screening third country 
investments.26 Finland’s foreign minister Kai 
Mykkänen even warned that the Commission’s 
plans, while trying to please France and 
Germany, would risk a trade war with China.27 
In turn, German state secretary Matthias 
Maching viewed the Council meeting as 
evidence of growing Chinese pressure on EU 
  
 




members who profit from infrastructure 
investments.28 
 
The incident, as noted by André Sapir, illustrates 
new lines of division in the European Council.29 
These cleavages, which have become 
increasingly pronounced since the emergence of 
China as a major investor in Europe following 
the European debt crisis, may increasingly 
complicate the EU’s ability to develop and 
implement measures for dealing with China 
collectively. They also may impact ongoing Sino-
European negotiations over a bilateral 
investment agreement. This agreement, through 
which Europeans seek to establish a level-
playing field in investment relations, has great 
potential for strengthening the BRI’s ‘win-win’ 
potential. The EU’s success in negotiating this 
agreement, for which they may use Europe’s 
market size and China’s growing interests as an 
investor as levers, however, hinges on the 
capacity of member states to act as a united 
group. With China growing ever more 
influential, especially in the EU’s periphery, this 
capacity has become increasingly uncertain. 
CONCLUSION 
In his State of the Union address, Commission 
president Jean-Claude Juncker chose strong 
words to address the challenges arising from 
China’s investment campaign: “Let me say once 
and for all: we are not naïve free traders. […] If 
a foreign, state-owned, company wants to 
purchase a European harbour, part of our 
energy infrastructure or a defence technology 
firm, this should only happen in transparency, 
with scrutiny and debate”.30 While his rhetoric 
sent a clear message to China, signalling the 
EU’s fading patience with a persistent lack of 
reciprocity, it also called on member states to 
stand united and support the Commission’s 
proposal for a European investment screening 
mechanism. The lukewarm support of some 
member states for the Commission’s initiative 
should set alarm bells ringing. The Union 
cannot afford to appear disunited or indecisive 
considering the economic and political 
challenges the BRI presents to Europe. The 
Commission’s struggle to gather support for an 
instrument that every major economy (including 
the US, China and 12 EU member states) 
applies to ensure their security and public order, 
raises questions about the EU’s capacity to deal 
with China in a meaningful and collective way. 
Restoring unity among member states vis-à-vis 
China therefore constitutes an increasingly 
pressing task to which EU institutions should 
assign the highest priority. After all, only a 
united EU will be able to push for the 
investment regulations and standards necessary 
to turn the BRI into a project that benefits both 
Chinese and European businesses and citizens. 
Stephan Klose is a PhD Candidate at the 
Institute for European Studies, Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel (VUB). His research 
interests include EU-East Asia Relations, 
the EU’s evolution as an international 
security actor, role theory and the 
theorization of actorness. 
Astrid Pepermans is a PhD candidate at the 
Political Science Department, Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel (VUB). Her research 
interests include Sino-European political 
and economic relations. 
Leia Wang is a university student of the 
World Bachelor in Business, a joint program 
between the University of Southern 
California, the Hong Kong University of 
Science and Technology, and Bocconi 




                                                
1 Xinhua (2017) ‘Belt and Road’ incorporated into CPC Consitution’, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-
10/24/c_136702025.htm, accessed 26 October 2017.  
2 European Commission (2017) ‘State of the Union 2017 – Trade Package: European Commission proposes 
framework for screening of foreign direct investments’, see 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1716, accessed 21 October 2017; European Commission 
(2016) ‘Engaging China in a Time of Transition’, see https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/file/strategic-note-16-engaging-china-
time-transition_en, accessed 21 October 2017; Non-Paper (2017) ‘European investment policy: A common approach 
to investment control’, see http://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/170728_Investment-screening_non-paper.pdf, accessed 21 October 2017. 
3 Jinping, X. (2017) ‘Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’, 
see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/16/c_136287878.htm, accessed 26 October 2017.  
4 China Daily (2017) ‘US welcome to Join Belt and Road Initiative’, see 
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2017-04/26/content_29086733.htm, accessed 26 October 2017. 
5 Financial Times (2017) ‘UK move to join China-led bank a surprise even to Beijing’, see: 
https://www.ft.com/content/d33fed8a-d3a1-11e4-a9d3-00144feab7de, accessed 26 October 2017. 
6 Weiss, M. A. (2017) ‘Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, see https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44754.pdf, accessed 
26 October 2017. 
7 Financial Times (2017) ‘In Charts: China’s Belt and Road Initiative’, see: https://www.ft.com/content/18db2e80-
3571-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e, accessed 26 October 2017. 
8 Clover et al. (2017) Financial Times (2017) ‘China’s Xi hails Belt and Road as ‘project of the century’’, see 
https://www.ft.com/content/88d584a2-385e-11e7-821a-6027b8a20f23?mhq5j=e1, accessed 26 October 2017.  
9 Financial Times (2017) ‘EU sets collision course with China over ‘Silk Road’ rail project’, see 
https://www.ft.com/content/003bad14-f52f-11e6-95ee-f14e55513608, accessed 26 October 2017. 
10 Financial Times (2011) ‘China group sees collapse of Poland ambitions’, see: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d17dda5a-96b7-11e0-baca-
00144feab49a.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4nAv3BOcF, accessed 26 October, 2017. 




_NEWS, accessed 26 October, 2017.  
12 Guardian (2017) ‘EU backs away from trade statement in blow to China’s ‘modern Silk Road’ plan, see: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/15/eu-china-summit-bejing-xi-jinping-belt-and-road, accessed 26 
October 2017. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Mercator Institute for China Studies (2016) ‘One-way train from China to Central Europe’, see: 
https://blog.merics.org/en/blog-post/2016/11/09/one-way-train-from-china-to-central-europe/, accessed 26 
October 2017. 
15 Juncker, J. (2017) ‘Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the 12th EU-China Business Summit’, see: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-1526_en.htm, accessed 26 October 2017. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Financial Times (2016) ‘Europe lobby warns on China market barriers, see: https://www.ft.com/content/757f5246-
6fde-11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926, accessed 26 October 2017. 
18 European Commission (2016) ‘Engaging China in a Time of Transition’, see 
https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/file/strategic-note-16-engaging-china-time-transition_en, accessed 21 October 2017 
19 New York Times (2017) ‘In Greece, China finds an Ally Against Human Rights Criticism’, see 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/world/europe/china-human-rights-greece-united-nations.html, accessed 8 
July 2017. 
20 Fallon, T. (2016) ‘The EU, the South China Sea, and China’s Successful Wedge Strategy’, see: 
https://amti.csis.org/eu-south-china-sea-chinas-successful-wedge-strategy/, accessed 26 October 2017. 
21 Ujvari, B. (2016) ‘The European Union and the China-led transformation of Global Economic Governance’, see 
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ep85.pdf, accessed 21 October 2017.  
22 European Commission (2017) ‘State of the Union 2017 – Trade Package: European Commission proposes 
framework for screening of foreign direct investments’, see 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1716, accessed 21 October 2017; European Commission 
(2016) ‘Engaging China in a Time of Transition’, see https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/file/strategic-note-16-engaging-china-
time-transition_en, accessed 21 October 2017 
23 EU member states with national review mechanisms are Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
  
                                                                                                                                                     
24 European Commission (2017) ‘State of the Union 2017 – Trade Package: European Commission proposes 
framework for screening of foreign direct investments’, see 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1716, accessed 21 October 2017 
25 Non-Paper (2017) ‘European investment policy: A common approach to investment control’, see 
http://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/170728_Investment-
screening_non-paper.pdf, accessed 21 October 2017. 
26 Politico (2017) ‘Enter the Dragon’, see http://www.politico.eu/article/china-and-the-troika-portugal-foreign-
investment-screening-takeovers-europe/, accessed 21 October 2017. 
27 Financial Times (2017) ‘EU plan to curb Chinese takeovers risks ‘trade war’’, see 
https://www.ft.com/content/c0b3bdf0-9b94-11e7-9a86-4d5a475ba4c5, accessed 21 October 2017. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid. 
30 European Commission (2017) ‘President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017’, see: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm, accessed 26 October 2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
